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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses some aspects of the on-board application of Expert
Systems (ES's) in artificial satellites. The ideas presented are mainly based
on the experience gained during a study performed by LABEN, CRI DORNIER and
CRISA under European Space Agency (ESA) contract; the activities of the study,
which include the implementation of two prototypes on a dedicated AI machine,
are described. The more general implications of the experience are then
discussed. These concern firstly, the interrelationship between the ES and
the architecture of the satellite and its impact on the mission definition
phase of the satellite lifecycle. Secondly, the main obstacles that need to
be overcome before operational use of ES's on-board can take place, and Namely
the matters of testing, knowledge collection, and availability of computing
resources. Finally, the activities that appear to be required in the near
future to prepare the way for the full exploitation of this technology for
satellite autonomy are briefly outlined, together with a brief description of
an ongoing work studying the application of AI tecnniques for the management
of the Cassini Titan probe; the probe will not have a telecomand link and will
therefore have to manage autonomously its descent on Titan.
INTRODUCTION
Lately increased satellite autonomy has become a more pressing necessity;
the reasons are various, but all have their roots in the fact that current
technology allows very complicated missions to be implemented, the control of
which, with the methods developed for satellites of previous generations, is
extrememly costly. The recent availability of powerful development
environments for Expert Systems (ES) has simplified the implementation of
these to the point of making them viable tools for the achievement of
increased spacecraft autonomy, and some activities nave been initiated by the
ESA to investigate the possibilities of applications of ES's to its own
purposes.
ESA SMELLITE ARCHITECTURE
Over tne last twenty odd years an architecture and a relatively fixed
break-down into major functional subsystems have become generally accepted.
The subsystems usually include Structure, Thermal, Power, Data Handling,
Attitude and Orbit control, Telemetry/Telecommand, Antennas, and Payload(s).
This break-down in functional subsystems represents the best compromise among
often contrasting requirements, of which a significant one is the need to
comply with geographical distribution i.e. assignment of tasks to companies in
all participating member-states
In this architecture the Data Handling (OBDH) represents the core of the
whole spacecraft from the point of view of control and monitoring; it performs
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all the functions required to decode and distribute telecommands, gather and
format spacecraft data for telemetry, and to provide a general purpose
on-board data processing facility. The design of the OBDHis based on a
distributed architecture of (intelligent) units connected by a serial bus;
specialised units provide interfaces to satellite subsystemsand payloads,
while a Centra] Unit controls bus data traffic and general subsystem
operation. The fact tnat this subsystem has access to all satellite data and
that it includes a numberof computing resources makesit the "natural" host
of an on-board ES for autonomy.
SIIJDY OF EXPERT SYSTEM FOR SPACECRAJ=T MANAGEMENT
One of the studies initiated by ESA had as main purposes to verify the
feasibility of an on-board ES for the management of an autonomous spacecraft,
to identify the general requirements of such an ES, to assess the resulting on
board complexity, and finally to identify areas for future research in the
field. Tne study was carried out by a consortium of four companies: LABEN
(Italy), CRI (Denmark), Dornier (W. Germany) and CRISA (Spain).
The first task was to identify a satellite which could be used as
reference for the study. It was as decided to define a "hypothetical"
satellite, rather than rely on a real design, because it was thought that this
would allow it to be tailored to fit the purposes of the study; this in fact
resembles the "toy problem" approach. The definition of the reference
satellite served its purpose, because it provided a stable, logically well
defined test case of reasonable complexity, but the whole procedure introduced
some difficulties that will be explained later. The architecture of the
reference satellite was based on the functional breakdown usual for ESA
satellites, and the ES was supposed hosted in the OBDH.
Although the eventual goal of the study was to increase satellite autono-
my by the exploitation of ES technology in an a priori unrestricted fashion,
it was also clear it would be necessary to identify a limited application
domain. The second task of the study was therefore a review of the
possibilities within the general areas of mission, health and failure man-
agement; of these, the mission and health management were discarded because
these tasks consist essentially of resource and activity scheduling, and ther-
efore require reasoning about time. The remaining one, fault management, was
Chosen also because diagnosis is one of the historically successful applicati-
ons of ES's. For what regards the object of the fault management activity,
the Power and Data Handling subsystems were selected because the complexity of
their design and operation matched well with the goals of the study, the rele-
vant expertise is well established within the Consortium, and finally because
their continuous operation is vital for tne safety of the spacecraft.
The conventional metnod of knowledge acquisition through face to face
consultations between the domain experts and the ES builder was difficult due
to the geographical distribution of the personnel involved. Consequently,
after an initial study of the problem area, a "knowledge specification
formalism" was produced. This was then submitted to the domain experts, who
wrote down the problem solving knowledge, producing "paper knowledge bases".
These, together with the actual descriptions of the target systems (OBDH and
Power) were the input to the coding of the ES. There was good correspondence
between the knowledge specification formalism and the ES architecture.
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Consequently, the actual coding of the ES's using the "paper knowledge bases"
was fairly easy. However, it turned out that the problem solving strategy used
by the ES deviated in many cases from that of the experts. These deficiencies
had their roots in an insufficient problem analysis at the outset of the
study, or at least in the failure to identify the implicit assumptions about
diagnosis strategy within the specification formalism and to discuss them with
the domain experts. The proolem solving techniques should have been identifi-
ed better before the knowledge specification formalism was constructed. Alth-
ough the prototype systems seldom arrived at erroneous diagnoses, the failure
in capturing correctly the experts' strategic problem-solving knowledge is se-
rious. Obviously the solution adopted was too optimistic, and more
code-evaluate-update cycles are required even before the formalism is fixed;
afterwards it can be used by the experts to supply inputs to the knowledge
base in a reasonably simple yet consistent form.
The architecture of the ES was based on a representation which models the
fault propagation by means of a causal associational network. Such a network
allows certain sets of decision strategies to be implemented retaining an exp-
licit representation of the diagnostic knowledge. This knowledge is structur-
ed in three different layers: observation layer (symptoms and test), causal
layer (failure states) and diagnostic layer (diagnosed states). The observati-
on layer contains all the information that can be obtained by the subsystem
organised in symptoms and tests: the first ones are used to activate the diag-
nostic process, the second ones are used by the inference engine, during the
diagnostic process, to discriminate among failure hypotheses. The causal net-
work and diagnostic layers are represented by a directed acyclic graph of
nodes where each node identifies a state representing deviations from the
normal behaviour. Three types of nodes are used:
- Failure states: nodes which conjecture the occurrence of a failure in a
certain system component
- Diagnosed states: end nodes of the network containing the identification
of the failed system component
- Starting nodes: pointed at by the associational arcs as result of the
identification of a known symptom.
The nodes are connected by means of two types of arcs:
- Associational arcs that link the symptoms with starting nodes identifying
the weight of the association;
- Causal arcs that link couple of states identifying the weight of the
causality.
The development environment used in the study was the Inteliicorp's KEE
running on on a Texas Instruments Explorer workstation. The failure states
(diagnosis hypotheses) were implemented as units (frames), and the
determination of the causal pathways was effected through inferences over
rule-sets. Tests and actions were associated with the units representing
failure states as methods. The debugging facilities provided by the system
enhanced the "visibility" of the diagnosis process considerably, especially
compared to what would have been possible with a "conventional" software
development environment.
Two prototype expert systems were constructed, one for the Power S/S, and
one for the OBDH S/S. The user interfaces are similar in design for the two
systems.The graphical facilities of the development environment are used to
display information about knowledge bases, subsystem, and diagnosis process.
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The user's communication with the prototypes is based on menu selection. He
may specify the symptoms of a failure among those that are considered likely
by the experts; when the setting of the symptoms chosen for the test case is
completed, the diagnosis process is started. No emulation of the subsystems
has been implemented, so the user must supply the ES witn the outcome of the
actions it attempts to carry out, be these tests or activation of redundant
units. When more than one failure can conceivably cause the same symptoms, the
diagnosis process implemented in the ES will choose as first hypothesis the
most critical one on the basis of a criticality value that is associated to
each failure symptom.
IMPLICATIONS OF STUDY RESULTS
From the early stages of the study a difficulty arose in the definition
of the corrective actions that were to be executed by the on-board ES: quite
simply the choice was restricted to some redundancy switching. The difficulty
was initially attributed to the lack of detail in the satellite that had been
chosen as target; as more insight into the matter was acquired, it was
recognized that the problem was more basic than it seemed and that it was
also caused by the idea at the base of many a system design: to make each
component as much a "black box" as possible. This was compounded by the faCt
that, to avoid the difficulties related to the representation of time and the
reasoning about it, sequences of actions were considered only in atomic form.
The bottom line is that simplification of the interfaces among units reduces
integration and control problems, but severely limits the choice of action to
correct a failure, to the point of making questionable the advantages of an ES
compared to conventional algorithmic or table driven software. In the future
the complexity of spacecrafts will increase and so will integration problems;
in addition, the functional partition of the satellite in subsystems is
closely mapped into areas of competence of european industries which are by
now well established and not likely to be easily changed. Therefore, it is to
be expected that the same type of problem will appear in the future.
Another conclusion tnat can be drawn from the previous paragraph is that
it is difficult and not necessarily advantageous to use an ES in a satellite
designed without this technology in mind. This point of view is however very
much in contradiction with a ratner general attitude which is more or less
expressed by "first mission requirements must be defined, and from these
the need for an ES". In this respect it is interesting to note that even
within this study the flow of activities effectively followed this pattern:
first a reference satellite was defined on the basis of an architecture which
was developed with completely different priorities, and then an ES was
designed to take up tne tasks that were meant to be carried out Dy simple on
board HW or SW. One should of course accept that this represents an
"initiation rite" for most new technologies; at the same time, one should be
aware of its existence and of its limiting effects on the appreciation of the
technology. Requirements are inevitably influenced by what is known to be
feasible or available and therefore mission definition studies will take into
account ES technology; _owever, it is also clear that to rely only on this
mechanism will imply an unnecessary delay before a potentially extremely
useful technology can be applied to its full capabilities.
456
OPEN ISSUES
A number of problems remain to be solved before ES's can be accepted for
routine on board use. The first is the matter of validation, probably the big-
gest obstacle that needs to be overcome before on board ES applications become
accepted; current on-board SW for unmanned satellites is orders of magnitudes
less complex and "brute force" testing can achieve sufficient coverage. This
is certainly not going to be possible with ES's, and in fact, although the pr-
oblem has been identified and described, a satisfactory solution is not avail-
able; nevertheless, work is being carried out in this area, and one can feel
reasonably confident that an acceptable solution will be found. However, much
of the testing of ES's will continue to rely also on the assessment by human
experts of the "reasoning" that generated a specific output. The reasoning is
accessible only through SW facilities that are not justified in a satellite
out of ground contact; therefore there is a definite risk of having to choose
between two equally undesirable alternatives: installing on board a system
which is overburdened by unnecessary facilities, or performing the tests with-
out adequate support. A possible solution would be the development of a stand-
ard run time environment together with a tool for the automatic porting from
the development system to the run time environment. In this way the testing
and validation problem could be split in two parts, the first being the "conc-
eptual" testing, to take place in the full ES development environment, and the
second being done once and for all by the validation of a tool for the automa-
tic translation of the ES to a "streamlined" run time version. The translation
would consist essentially in the removal of the display, explanation, modific-
ation, etc. facilities and, when applicable, of a compilation.
The second problem is that space qualified HW which is currently availab-
le or in sight does not provide the resources that are needed to run in accep-
table time ES's that nave been developed with powerful shells. The previously
described combination of run time environment and automatic translation tool
could provide a meaningful contribution to the reduction of on-board resource
requirements without performance penalties.
Finally, within the european space industry the problem of knowledge col-
lection is compounded by the fact that experts are widely dispersed among dif-
ferent companies and countries; in tnis respect, procedures and tools to aid
the process of knowledge collection and formalization would be particularly
beneficial. The method used in this study can be seen only as a first step.
CONCLUSIONS
The two prototypes that nave been implemented proved that an ES that per-
forms a meaningful subset of the functions required for satellite autonomy is
feasible in the european space industry with current technology. The line of
activity has been extended to implement an ES to manage the descent of the
Cassini probe on Titan. This mission has been chosen as target because no TC
link will be available and because, given its relatively early stage of defin-
ition, it is hoped that the conceptual problems described earlier could be
overcome. The same consortium will implement a prototype on an AI workstation
and then transfer it to some HW more representative of on board resources; the
purpose of the additional step is to acquire some dimensioning information on
the related difficulty and to be able to run some performance tests.
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